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  The United States Army began a major force transformation in 2003, which 
required a significant shift in logistics support constructs.  This thesis provides an in-
process review of the effects of the current transformation efforts on supply effectiveness 
and attempts to determine factors that influence customer ordering behavior.  
Specifically, this thesis sought to answer three subproblems addressing the effect of 
transformation on supply effectiveness, the correlation of supply effectiveness metrics to 
customer ordering behavior, and identify other potential sources of variance in ordering 
behavior. 
  The subproblems were answered through an examination of the supply document 
histories of two Brigade Combat Teams during two six month periods, one in garrison 
and one in Iraq.  The results indicate that force transformation is increasing overall 
supply effectiveness, but that there is no correlation between the variables of supply 
effectiveness and customer ordering behavior.   
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 The United States Army began force transformation after Desert Storm/Desert 
Shield with what was originally known as the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(Maccagnan, 2005:1).  The purpose was to develop the Cold War force structure into a 
more responsive and agile force capable of handling a wide spectrum of operational 
scenarios (Caldera and Shinseki, 2000:3).  A responsive and agile force requires a 
responsive and agile logistics structure. 
 The Army logistics community took major initiatives in the mid-1990’s to reduce 
stockpiles at the tail-end of the supply pipeline and compensate with increased velocity of 
shipments.  This was known as Velocity Management and has evolved into the current 
doctrine of Distribution Based Logistics (DBL).  The 1998 shift to Velocity Management 
yielded one major problem that was to be recognized in the major force deployments to 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): the logistics 
community had focused on the reduction of stockage levels without a simultaneous 
improvement in the distribution network, resulting in low supply levels and no way to 
efficiently deliver more (ADCS-G4, 2003:6). 
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 The current Army transformation is from a Division and Corps based structure to 
a modular force structure using the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as the primary level of 
operations.  These structures are more deployable and capable of a wider spectrum of 
missions with only their internal assets.  This type of unit requires a matching change in 
the logistics doctrine.  The current draft doctrine consolidates support assets in the BCTs, 
creates a robust Sustainment Brigade at the Division level, eliminates the Corps Support 
Command, and creates modular Theater Sustainment Brigades (CASCOM, 2004:6).  The 
question that remains is: Are the revised logistical concepts having an impact at the BCT 
level? 
 Without an in-process analysis of the effects of the current changes, it is possible 
that the desired improvements and move to DBL will not be realized.  For Distribution 
Based Logistics to successfully function, the flow of supplies through the entire supply 
chain must be smooth, rapid and lacking in variance.  Common knowledge in both the 
civilian and military logistics communities states that the absence of these traits leads to 
large orders, misallocation of priority levels for requests, and an overall mistrust in the 
supply system.  This mistrust only increases the belief that orders need to be padded and 
that only high priority level requests are filled.  The goal of logistics transformation needs 
to be reduced and steady Customer Wait Time (CWT) in order for the DBL concepts to 
properly operate; with CWT being the amount of time that passes between customer 




 Logisticians need to know if the current changes in the force structure and 
logistics processes are having a positive effect on overall distribution effectiveness.  This 
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research attempted to answer this question through determining the effect of Army 
transformation on supply effectiveness for BCT level units and attempting to identify the 
effects of the supply effectiveness on customer ordering behavior in terms of the overuse 
of high priority designators and average order quantities.  Three subproblems served to 
answer the research problem. 
 




 The first subproblem was to determine the effects of Army transformation on 
supply effectiveness using the supply chain metrics of CWT and requisition backorders at 
the Brigade Forward Distribution Point (FDP) for units that have completed 
transformation.  This subproblem was addressed with Hypothesis 1 (H1): 
 H1:  Transformation status is positively correlated to supply effectiveness; using 
an inference from the two following quantitative hypotheses. 
 H1a:  Transformed units will have a lower average CWT for requisitions. 
 H1b:  Transformed units will have a lower average quantity of requisition 
backorders at their supporting FDP. 
Subproblem 2 
 
 The second subproblem was to establish the correlation of the supply 
effectiveness indicators of requisition backorders and CWT to the ordering characteristics 
of average order quantity and requisition priority designators.  Hypothesis 2 (H2) defined 
the correlations. 
 H2:  Ordering behavior is positively correlated to supply effectiveness; based on a 
combined inference from the following four quantitative hypotheses. 
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 H2a:  The average customer order quantity is positively correlated to the quantity 
of requisition backorders at their supporting warehouse. 
 H2b:  The percentage of high priority designators (PD 02) assigned to requisitions 
is positively correlated to the quantity of requisition backorders at the customer’s 
supporting warehouse. 
 H2c:  The average customer order quantity is positively correlated to CWT. 
 H2d:  The percentage of high priority designators (PD 02) assigned to requisitions 
is positively correlated to CWT. 
Subproblem 3 
  
 The third subproblem was to account for other sources of variance in the results.  
This subproblem utilized two hypotheses to serve as filters for ordering behavior. 
 H3:  Units submit a higher number of requisitions when deployed. 
 H4:  The allocation of priority designators is proportional to the number of 
customer requisitions. 
 
Research Objectives and Significance 
 
 The objectives of this research were twofold.  The first objective was to provide 
an answer concerning the impacts of force and logistics transformation on Customer Wait 
Time and requisition backorders for modular units.  The second objective was to 
determine if there is a correlation between the aforementioned metrics and customer 
ordering behavior, specifically priority assignments and order quantities.  In the review of 
the literature, no previous studies on the effects of the current transformation, as well as 
no definitive analysis of the effects of supply chain performance on customer ordering 
characteristics were discovered.  This lack of published analysis makes quantifying 
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improvements difficult at best.  This research provides actual analysis of customer 
requisitions at the BCT level in an attempt to define the widely held beliefs concerning 
CWT and backorders respective effects on customer behavior. 
 
Research Scope and Limitations 
 
 This research evaluated the subproblems through analyzing the Class II (General 
Supply) and Class IX (Repair Parts) requisitions for two Brigades, one transformed 
Brigade and one legacy Brigade, during two six-month periods, one in garrison and one 
in Iraq.  Some of the major limitations were the long-term nature of the transformation 
process, meaning that not all levels of the supply chain have not transformed; difficulty in 
normalizing unit ordering behavior due to operational differences in the force structure; 
and differences in the ordering systems and characteristics of the different supply classes.  
These limitations and the respective delimitations are discussed in Chapter 3. 
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II. Review of the Related Literature 
 
 
 This chapter presents the background information required to understand Army 
logistics transformation and the importance of the hypotheses chosen for evaluating the 
research problem.  In order to do this, one must first understand the definition of 
transformation in the sense of the current changes in the U.S. Army.  The definitions are 
followed by a discussion of the basis for operational force transformation, logistics 
transformation, and logistics doctrine development.  The chapter closes with a look at 
new metrics for evaluating the supply chain and the influence of Customer Wait Time on 




 Transformation is a broad and ambiguous word that can apply to any process 
change.  In terms of the current U.S. Army reorganization, transformation is defined as “a 
process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through 
new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations” (Department of 
the Army, 2003b: D-3).  This seemingly ambiguous definition reflects the breadth of 
change currently occurring in the U.S. Army.  The most basic change is the 
transformation from a Cold War force focused on fighting on a widespread linear 
battlefield to an Army based on a modular force concept.  These are new organizations 
designed to “provide a mix of land combat power that can be task organized for any 
combination of . . . operations in support of a joint campaign” (TRADOC, 2003:1-6).  
There are three primary levels of modular forces: Brigade Combat Team (BCT), Primary 
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War fighting Headquarters (UEx), and the Joint Support Headquarters (UEy) (TRADOC, 
2003:1-7). 
 
Basis for Transformation 
  
 Understanding of the goals of transformation is critical to being able to evaluate 
the current direction of logistics change.  This discussion provides an overview of Army 
transformation and logistics transformation. 
Operational Force Transformation  
 
 The Army is transforming from its Cold War force structure based on forward 
deployed units into a more responsive and agile force.  The process began after Desert 
Storm/Desert Shield with what was initially described as the Revolution in Military 
Affairs, now known as transformation (Maccagnan, 2005:1).  It was determined that the 
land forces needed the capability to respond to a variety of missions, including 
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peace-keeping, peace-making, and major theater 
wars (Caldera and Shinseki, 2000:3).  In fact, since 1995, the U.S. Army has participated 
in all of the above operations from Haiti to Bosnia and Afghanistan to Iraq.  The 
determination was made that the new force structure must be responsive, deployable, 
agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable (Caldera and Shinseki, 2000:4-5).   
Logistics Transformation 
 
 Logistics transformation is requisite in meeting all of these characteristics, with its 
greatest presence in deployability, agility, and sustainability.  In order to meet the 
deployability goals of a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) on ground anywhere in the world 
in 96-hours, Division level units (3-4 BCTs) in 120 hours, and five Division equivalents 
in 30 days the logistics footprint must be minimized (Peltz, Halliday, and Hartman, 
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2006:6).  Agility requires that a BCT be able to transition missions quickly and move 
rapidly across the battle-space, which means its internal support needs to be capable of 
self-movement, without external support for short durations (less than 72 hours) 
(CASCOM, 2004:4).  Finally, the force must be sustainable, with minimal internal 
logistics.  Every increase in internal logistics capability creates a subsequent increase in 
the assets required to move the force.  This fact has created the move to Distribution 
Based Logistics for the entire Army supply chain, an operational concept relying on 
“distribution velocity and precision, rather than redundant supply mass, to provide 
responsive support” (McKay and Flowers, 2000, 44). 
 
Development of Logistics Doctrine  
 
 As the Army transforms, a new support doctrine is required.  The difficulty in 
developing new support structures is that the requirements are not fully realized until the 
combat force is transformed.  As the Army moves from the Corps to the Brigade Combat 
Team as the level of employment, logistics forces are required to modularize and rely on 
Distribution Based Logistics (Hilburn, 2006:16). 
 The basic concepts for the logistics transformation to DBL were outlined by the 
Army Deputy Chief of Staff-G4, LTG Christianson, in 2003.  He described the four focus 
areas required to meet the critical task to “sustain the combat readiness of our Deployed 
Force and to maintain the operational readiness of the Current Force” (ADCS-G4, 
2003:2).  The areas are: connect Army logisticians, modernize theater distribution, 
improve force reception, and integrate the supply chain. 
 Modernizing theater distribution “rests solidly on the fundamental concepts of 
distribution-based logistics” (ADCS-G4, 2003:4).  Distribution improvement reduces the 
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variance in lead times and enables the reduction of forward stocks required to maintain 
the force.  Improved distribution will allow the integration of the components of the 
supply system into one large storage chain, with stocks stored in CONUS and in the 
pipeline, instead of stored forward, which is a recognition of the problem created by the 
1998 shift to velocity management under the Revolution in Military Logistics 
(Maccagnan, 2005:2).  The problem was the large-scale reduction of stockage levels in 
units without a simultaneous improvement in the distribution network, resulting in low 
supplies and no way to efficiently deliver more (ADCS-G4, 2003:6). 
 The U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) has developed 
draft doctrine for logistics transformation.  This doctrine consolidates support assets in 
the BCTs, creates a robust Sustainment Brigade at the Division level, eliminates the 
Corps Support Command, and creates modular Theater Sustainment Brigades 
(CASCOM, 2004:6).  The elimination of a level of logistics headquarters is an obvious 
improvement; removing layers is an accepted way of improving processes in business, so 
it will work in military logistics through helping to reduce the “Bullwhip Effect.”  The 
consolidation of support assets in the Brigade Combat Teams is another major change.  
These assets will fall under the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB), which will provide full 
support for the maneuver battalions assigned to the BCT.  An enhancement to the BSB is 
the Materiel Management Center (MMC), an asset that was previously located only at the 
Division level.  The MMC is the supply ordering and maintenance control section for the 
BCT; this organization is the true enabler for a BCT to be able to move under any other 
headquarters.  
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  These changes in the logistics force facilitate the movement of supplies through 
the distribution pipeline.  Fewer headquarters layers lead to shorter time for the requests 
to reach the Inventory Managers from overseas with less information distortion.  The 
placement of an MMC in every BCT enables the tracking of incoming supplies and 
outbound requests to be managed at the level that needs the information.  With these 
changes to the logistics doctrine and force structure come an intuitive change in the 
metrics that are used to measure the effectiveness of the supply chain.  The metrics must 
reflect the intent of the system that they are measuring. 
 
Choosing the Metrics 
 
 To evaluate any system, mutually agreed upon metrics must be developed.  The 
old supply metrics, such as the number of zero balance lines at the tactical Supply 
Support Activity, are exchanged for the stockage level in the pipeline.  The old order 
ship-time standards are no longer relevant for supporting units that maintain less than 72-
hours of on-hand supplies.  If a request takes 14 days to arrive, there is no way to carry 
only 72-hours of on-hand stock and survive until the order arrives.  Order ship-time is not 
an obsolete metric; it is still useful for measuring the inter-process time for shipments 
between supply levels.   
 Reduction of forward assets mandates the rapid delivery and elimination of 
variability in the supply chain (ADCS-G4, 2003:6).  Measurement of the effectiveness of 
these improvements is most accurately reflected by Customer Wait Time (CWT), which 
became an official metric in 2001 for use in evaluating velocity management 
improvements.  CWT “measures the speed and efficiency of the logistics community’s 
ability to support the soldier in the field” (Department of the Army, 2003a:1-12).  The 
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metric encompasses the entire span of time from when a unit enters a supply request until 
the unit has the item in hand.  As an end-to-end measure of the supply chain, CWT is a 
better measure of a logistics structure reliant on distribution and can serve as a predictor 
of customer ordering behavior.  For this reason, CWT is the metric that used in this 
research to evaluate overall improvement of the supply chain and its effects on customer 
ordering behavior. 
 
The Influence of Customer Wait Time on Customer Ordering Behavior 
 
  Based on the change to Distribution Based Logistics, the measurement of interest 
becomes Customer Wait Time (CWT).  CWT is a reflection on the change in the logistics 
community to a focus on customer support.  This is the lead time for resupply that 
customers of the supply system use for planning.  If CWT variance is high, which results 
from inefficiencies and breakdowns in the distribution system, the current belief is 
customers will pad orders to cover future lead times (Myers, 2004).  If CWT is extremely 
high, the current belief is units will use a higher quantity of high-level priority 
designators for requisitions in order to fill critical shortages or due to impatience with the 
system (Myers, 2004).  In 2003, for all OIF requisitions, 80% of Class II and over 50% of 
Class IX requisitions had priority designators of 1, 2, or 3, which are all from the top tier 
of requisition priority levels (Carpenter, 2004:22).  The result was that all of the high 
priority requests became average priority, which further exacerbated the problem and 





 The Army is in the process of transforming from its Cold War structure to a 
modular force structure based on the need to accomplish a wide variety of missions with 
a new set of performance characteristics.  To meet the goals of the new force structure, a 
corresponding change in the logistics force is required along with a new logistics 
doctrine.  To provide responsive and flexible logistics support, Army logistics is moving 
from a just in case stockage mentality to a distribution based support structure.  The 
change to a distribution based structure requires a different metric to be used for 
measuring the effectiveness of the system.  In this thesis, Customer Wait Time was the 





 The purpose of this chapter is to outline the methodology used in conducting the 
research.  The first topic is the limitations and delimitations, followed by sample 
selection.  The next topics are data requirements and data collection.  The chapter will 
conclude with a discussion of the treatments of the data to answer the hypotheses 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
Limitations and Delimitations 
 
 This research faced several limitations based on the large scale and long-term 
nature of the Army transformation process.  The first limitation was that all of the layers 
of the supply chain have not undergone transformation; rather, transformation is 
occurring in a patchwork fashion across the force.  This prevented a full analysis of the 
effectiveness of the reformed supply chain.  The delimitation was to only focus on the 
BCT level for analysis and use CWT as the metric for measurement.  CWT accounts for 
the entire supply chain, therefore above BCT changes were applied equally to both 
Brigades.  The potential difference in CWT was limited to transformation status. 
 The second limitation was the difficulty in normalizing unit ordering behavior due 
to operational and structural differences in the force structure.  The operational 
delimitation was to evaluate both Brigades in garrison and in Iraq, which encompassed a 
larger spectrum of time and situations in order to make a better comparison.  The 
structural delimitation was to normalize the two sample Brigades.  Due to a modular 
Brigade having units with traditionally low density or limited part availability equipment, 
Engineers and Field Artillery, these units were excluded from the evaluation.  The only 
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assigned units analyzed were the maneuver battalions and support battalion.  This 
ensured that the results are not skewed by requisitions for parts that traditionally have 
long wait times. 
 The third limitation was the rapid changes in the overall logistics structure as 
Operation Iraqi Freedom progressed.  The shortages of 2003 are well documented and 
other fluctuations could potentially skew the data.  The delimitation was to look at the 
two Brigades during the same six-month periods.  This ensures that both were subject to 
the same logistical fluctuations. 
 The fourth limitation was that different supply classes have widely varying 
ordering systems and characteristics.  The delimitation was to focus on only Class II 
(General Supply) and Class IX (Repair Parts) requisitions.  These two classes exhibit 





 Based on the above limitations, the research required two Brigades that were in 
garrison and Iraq during the same periods, one transformed and one legacy.  The 
Brigades were chosen through analyzing Division websites and news releases until two 
that most closely met the criteria were selected.  Hereafter, the legacy Brigade is referred 
to as Unit 1 and the transformed Brigade as Unit 2.  As previously discussed, the units 
inherent to a transformed Brigade that are not part of a legacy Brigade were excluded 
from the analysis.  Specifically excluded were the Engineers, Field Artillery, and Special 
Troops Battalion.  The periods used for Unit 1 are 1 June – 30 November 2005 (Garrison) 
and 1 June – 30 November 2006 (OIF).  For Unit 2, the periods are 1 May – 31 October 
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2005 (Garrison) and 1 May – 31 October 2006 (OIF).  The off-set was due to deployment 





 Determining the effect of Army transformation on supply effectiveness at the 
BCT level and identifying the respective effects on customer ordering characteristics 
required establishing correlations between the variables using a longitudinal data set.  In 
order to address CWT, priority assignment, and average order quantities, the data 
requirements were all of the requisitions and issues posted by the units of interest during 
the periods of evaluation.  The requisition backorder analysis required the respective 
warehouse backorder statistics during the periods of interest.  Collecting the data first 
required obtaining the Department of Defense Activity Address Codes (DODAAC) for 




 All of the data requirements were met through the Army Logistics Information 
Warehouse (LIW), an on-line repository of all logistics related data for the U.S. Army.  
The first step was to obtain the required DODAACs and RICs for the units of interest.  
These were retrieved from the Logistics Information Database (LIDB), accessed through 
LIW.  For each company level unit, the Class II and IX DODAACs, both for garrison and 
Iraq were retrieved.  Table 1 shows the results.  The difference in the number of 
DODAACs is due to transformed units having an additional maneuver battalion and 
additional companies in the support battalion.  The next step was to retrieve the RICs for 
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Table 1. Number of DODAACs by Unit and Type 
II IX II IX
Garrison 15 17 26 32
Iraq 16 19 25 29
Unit 1 Unit 2
Source: Army Logistics Information Database
the warehouses, also using LIDB; this provided 2 RICs for each BCT, one each for 
garrison and Iraq.   
 The documents were retrieved through the Integrated Logistics Analysis Program 
(ILAP), also accessed through LIW.  The entire document history for each DODAAC 
was downloaded by utilizing the SARSS 2B Document History (DIC-NIIN) report 
function.  The backorder data for the warehouses was retrieved through the SARSS 
Backorder Report Module.  The backorder data was compiled in approximately week 
increments, these same increments were later used to organize the requisition and issue 
data for analysis.  The time increments produced in this report were used as the periods of 
analysis for all of the testing in this thesis.  A full listing of the periods is provided in 
Appendix A, Table 7. 
 Total data retrieved for conducting the analysis included 154,842 customer issues 
for CWT calculations, 149,699 requests for priority designator and order quantity 
calculations, and Classes II and IX backorder data for 94 periods to conduct backorder 
calculations. 
 
Treatment of the Data 
 
 This section discusses the treatment of the data as it pertains to preparing to 
answer the hypotheses associated with the three subproblems.  Table 7 in Appendix A 
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shows the periods used for analysis and Table 8 in Appendix A provide a sample data 
table for the reader’s reference. 
Hypothesis 1 
 
 Recall that H1 proposed that transformation status is positively correlated to 
supply effectiveness.  CWT and average quantity of requisitions backorders served as 
proxy variables for supply effectiveness.  This study measured CWT as the amount of 
time from the Julian date of the requisition document number to the time the customer 
issue was posted by the warehouse.  Comparing the two BCTs was accomplished using a 
series of two-sample T-tests for each of the variables; these test were then used to infer 
the answer to the first hypothesis.   
 The CWT comparisons were conducted by calculating the average customer wait 
time for each period as provided by the above mentioned backorder report.  The 
comparison samples consisted of the average of all periods for that unit.  For example, 
the garrison Class II requisitions average for Unit 1 was calculated using 23 periods.  
Each period consisted of the average among the combined requisitions from each of the 
15 DODAACs.  The average quantity of requisition backorders comparisons were 
conducted by comparing the average of the backorders older than 30 days at the BCT 
warehouse.  Thirty days was used because it is the generally accepted point at which 
customers begin to look at alternate ordering means. 
Hypothesis 2 
 
 H2 proposed that customer ordering behavior is correlated to supply 
effectiveness.  This hypothesis utilized average customer order quantity and percentage 
of the total requisitions that are high priority (PD 02) as proxy variables for ordering 
 17
behavior and average requisition backorders and CWT as proxies for supply 
effectiveness.  The data results were calculated utilizing a Pearson Correlation Matrix 
with the variables compared across each period.  Average customer order quantity was 
calculated by taking the average quantity for all of the items ordered during a period by 
the unit for a specific class of supply. One important note is that the customer ordering 




 H3 proposed that the customers will submit more requisitions while deployed.  
This hypothesis was analyzed using a t-test to compare the number of requisitions 
between deployed and garrison units.  The data consisted of the average of all 192 order 
periods for both units in garrison and both units in Iraq.  The correlations were calculated 
based on all orders, not separated by Class II and IX.   
Hypothesis 4 
 
 H4 proposed that the allocation of priority designators is proportional to the 
number of customer requisitions.  This hypothesis was analyzed using a Pearson 
Correlation Table for the variables of percentage of high priority (PD 02), percentage of 
medium priority (PD 05), percentage of low priority (PD 12), and Total Number of 
Requisitions compared across the periods.  Further analysis was conducted using a t-test 
to compare the average percentage of PD 02 requisitions for garrison and Iraq.    
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
 This chapter provides the results of each hypothesis test and answers the 





 The first subproblem was to determine the effects of Army transformation on 
supply effectiveness using the supply chain metrics of CWT and requisition backorders at 
the Brigade Forward Distribution Point (FDP) for units that have completed 
transformation.  Hypothesis 1 proposed that transformation status is positively correlated 
to supply effectiveness. 
H1a Results 
 
 This portion of H1 stated that transformed units will have a lower average CWT 
for requisitions.  Five different t-tests were conducted: between both units for all supply 
in garrison, between both units for all supply in Iraq, between both units for Class II in 
both locations, between both units for Class IX in both locations, and for both units for all 
supply in both locations.  The N represents the number of periods used in the analysis as 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
 Two of the tests reported no significant difference at a 95% confidence level; 
these were Class IX in both locations (p = 0.0640) and both supply classes in Iraq (p = 
0.1220).  Overall the results show there was a significant improvement in CWT with the 
transformed BCT (Unit 2) with an estimated difference of 7.94 days.  Even more 
 19
interesting is that in every test, the standard deviation was significantly less for Unit 2.  
Table 2 shows the full set of results.    
 
Table 2. Results for Customer Wait Time Comparisons 
Lower Upper
Unit 1 Garrison II/IX 46 33.2 15.8 2.3
Unit 2 Garrison II/IX 38 22.4 10.5 1.7
Unit 1 Iraq II/IX 54 32.3 20.5 2.8
Unit 2 Iraq II/IX 54 26.45 9.98 1.4
Unit 1 All II 50 44.3 16 2.3
Unit 2 All II 46 31.42 9.89 1.5
Unit 1 All IX 50 21.2 12.5 1.8
Unit 2 All IX 46 18.17 5.33 0.79
Unit 1 All II/IX 100 32.7 18.4 1.8
Unit 2 All II/IX 92 24.8 10.3 1.1 0.0000
* Result is significant if ≤0.05
5 7.94 3.72 12.15
0.0000
4 3.038 -0.83 6.91 0.1220
3 12.84 7.47 18.2
Significance 
Level*
2 5.85 -0.34 12.03 0.0640
1




10.8 5.06 16.54 0.0000
H1b Results 
 
 This portion of H1 proposed that transformed units will have a lower average 
quantity of requisition backorders at their supporting FDP.  Six different t-tests were 
conducted: between both units for Class IX in garrison and Iraq, between both units for 
Class IX in garrison, between both units for Class IX in Iraq, between both units for Class 
II in garrison and Iraq, between both units for Class II in garrison, and between both units 
for Class II in Iraq.  The reason for only looking at separate backorder levels was that 
there is a difference in urgency between Class II (General Supply) and Class IX (Repair 
Part) requisitions.  In this respect, these two classes are different in their effects on 
ordering. 
 The results show that Unit 2 had a higher average number of backorders over 30 
days than Unit 1 in all areas except for garrison requisitions.  In garrison, Unit 2 had 
fewer average backorders than Unit 1 for both Class II and Class IX.  The full results are 
presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Results for Average Backorder Comparisons 
Lower Upper
Unit 1 All IX 48 2113 489 71
Unit 2 All IX 46 2906 1307 193
Unit 1 Garrison IX 22 2098 177 38
Unit 2 Garrison IX 19 1674 472 108
Unit 1 Iraq IX 26 2125 651 128
Unit 2 Iraq IX 27 3772 956 184
Unit 1 All II 48 775 321 46
Unit 2 All II 46 1145 725 107
Unit 1 Garrison II 22 492 114 24
Unit 2 Garrison II 19 420.4 95.5 22
Unit 1 Iraq II 26 1014 230 45
Unit 2 Iraq II 27 1656 499 96
* Result is significant if ≤0.05
6 -641.82 -856.98 -426.67 0.0000
0.0020
5 71.9 5.54 138.26 0.0340
4 -370.64 -603.58 -137.71
0.0010
3 -1647.12 -2098.31 -1195.93 0.0000
2 423.77 185.79 661.74
95% CI for Difference Significance 
Level*
1 -792.96 -1204.11 -381.81 0.0000
Test # Unit/Location
Supply 
Class N Mean Std Dev SE Mean
Difference 
Estimate
Results and Analysis of Hypothesis 1 
 
 Based on the two subparts, transformation status is not positively correlated to 
supply effectiveness.  Transformation is associated with improved CWT, but the number 
of backorders increased.  The full answer depends on one’s world view of backorders and 
CWT.  If the backordered items were lower demand or PD 12 requisitions then it is not a 
negative result.  If the items were PD 02 requisitions, then it is a negative result.  This 
researcher’s view is that CWT and its variance are more important than the overall 
number of backordered requisitions in determining supply effectiveness, particularly if it 
does not result in higher order quantities or duplicate orders at a higher priority level.   
 To verify this, a Pearson Correlation calculation was calculated for the effects of 
backorders over 30 days on average order quantity and percent PD 02 requisitions for 
Unit 2, which yielded statistically insignificant correlations of -0.014 and -0.047 
respectively.  This shows that there was almost no effect on the primary customer 
ordering characteristics.  With this information, it was concluded that transformation is 





 The second subproblem was to establish the correlation of the supply 
effectiveness indicators of requisition backorders and CWT to the ordering characteristics 
of average order quantity and requisition priority designators.  Hypothesis 2 proposed 
that ordering behavior is positively correlated to supply effectiveness.  The tested 
subparts were: 
 H2a:  The average customer order quantity is positively correlated to the quantity 
of requisition backorders at their supporting warehouse. 
 H2b:  The percentage of high priority designators (PD 02) assigned to requisitions 
is positively correlated to the quantity of requisition backorders at the customer’s 
supporting warehouse. 
 H2c:  The average customer order quantity is positively correlated to CWT. 
 H2d:  The percentage of high priority designators (PD 02) assigned to requisitions 
is positively correlated to CWT. 
Hypothesis 2 Results and Analysis 
 
 Utilizing a Pearson Correlation Matrix to calculate the relationships at a 95% 
level yielded no correlation for any of the subparts.  The closest relationship was Average 
Order Quantity to Quantity of Requisition Backorders with a -0.147 correlation, but with 
a p-value of 0.054 it was statistically insignificant.  The full results are presented in Table 
4. 
 These results show that based on the research sample there was no correlation 
between the ordering characteristics of average order quantity and priority level and the 
supply effectiveness characteristics of CWT and requisition backorders in the following 
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period.  This result is worth noting because it is counter to traditional wisdom on supply 
chain management, which teaches that these are primary drivers of ordering behavior. 
Table 4. Correlation of Ordering Characteristics to Supply Indicators 
N Average CWT Backorders Over 30 Days
0.000 -0.020 Pearson Correlation
0.997 0.790 Significance*
0.105 -0.147 Pearson Correlation
0.170 0.054 Significance*









 The third subproblem was to account for other sources of variance in the results.  
This subproblem utilized two hypotheses to serve as filters for ordering behavior. 
Hypothesis 3 Results and Analysis 
 
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that the number of requisitions submitted by a customer is 
correlated to their deployment status.  This hypothesis was based on the belief that units 
will consume more in a deployed versus garrison environment.  Analysis was conducted 
using two t-tests: one compared garrison Class II with Iraq Class II requests and the 
second made the same comparison but with Class IX.  For these tests, the unit was not 
relevant, so the data was pooled to provide a larger sample.  The results showed that there 
was no significant difference between garrison and Iraq quantities of requisitions at a 
95% confidence for either Class II (p = 0.278) or Class IX (p = 0.941).  Table 5 shows 
the full results. 
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Table 5. Comparison of Average Number of Requisitions 
The results s itions in Iraq 
as they
s and Analysis
 Lower Upper 
All Garrison II 40 327 373 59
All Iraq II 52 404 281 39
All Garrison IX 40 1256 1010 160
All Iraq IX 52 1243 486 67
* Result is significant if =0.05 
0.94102 12.82 -335.09 360.74 
95% CI for Difference Significance 
Level *
1 -77.15 -217.98 63.68 0.2780
Test # Unit/Location 
Supply 




how that units are submitting the same number of requis
 do in garrison.  Based on this result, the number of requisitions is not affecting the 
overall pipeline and CWT. 
Hypothesis 4 Result  
 






Hypothesis 4 predicted that the alloc
the number of customer requisitions.  This was based on the belief that as numbers of 
requisitions fluctuate, the overall percentages of requisition priorities will remain static
Therefore the correlation coefficients should all be close to zero for this hypothesis to be 
validated.  The results of the Pearson Correlation analysis yielded the following:  PD 02 
versus number of requisitions is -0.137, PD 05 versus number of requisitions is 0.082, 
and PD 12 versus the number of requisitions is 0.125.  These results validated that the 
percentages of each priority designator do not fluctuate with the number of requisitions
 A second step in analyzing the allocation of priority designators was to compare 
the percentages of PD 02 requisitions between garrison and Iraq.  Two t-tests were used 
to compare both units in garrison and Iraq for Class II and both units in garrison and Iraq
for Class IX.  These tests were chosen to match with the average number of requisitions 
comparisons used in Hypothesis 3.  The results were that there is a significant increase in
the percentages of PD 02 requisitions for both supply classes between garrison and Iraq.  
The estimated differences were -.19 (p = 0.005) for Class II and -.21 (p = 0.000) for Class
IX.  It is important to note that this data was calculated using percentages; therefore the 
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scale is 0 to 1.  Converted to actual percentages, the increases are 19% and 21% 
respectively.  Table 6 presents the full results. 
Table 6. Comparison of Percentage High Priority Requisitions 
Additional Tests for CWT 
 
 ce in the number of requisitions between garrison and 
D 
 
Summary of Results and Analysis 




All Garrison II 40 0.412 0.346 0.055
All Iraq II 52 0.601 0.268 0.037
All Garrison IX 40 0.373 0.211 0.033




1 -0.19 -0.32 -0.05 0.0050
2 -0.21 -0.29 -0.13 0.0000
* Result is significant if ≤0.05
Lowern
Supply 
Class N Mean Std Dev SE Mean
Difference 
Estimate
95% CI for Di
Due to the lack of a differen
Iraq and the high increases in use of PD 02, farther analysis was warranted.  A quick t-
test comparing the CWT for all garrison requisition periods (N = 84, Mean = 28.35, ST
Dev = 14.61) to all Iraq requisition periods (N = 108, Mean = 29.38, SD = 16.33) yielded 
the result of no significant difference with a p-value of .6484.  This result also validated 
the results for Hypothesis 2 which found no correlation between CWT and the percent of
requisitions assigned PD 02. 
  
 
 This chapter presented the res
supply effectiveness is improving with transformation, specifically through reduced 
average CWT and CWT variance, which answers the first subproblem.  The second 
subproblem was answered when the correlation analysis showed no significant 
correlation between the variables.  Subproblem 3 yielded some interesting result
the testing of the third and fourth hypotheses.  The first is that the average number of 
requisitions in Iraq and garrison are statistically equal.  The second is that priority 
designators remain allocated along the same percentages based on the total number
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requisitions for a period.  However, this result does not match the comparison of the 
percentages of high priority requests between garrison and Iraq.  That test showed a 
significant difference in the percentages of high priority requisitions.  A final check o





 This research yielded a variety of results, from the expected to the unexpected.  
This chapter seeks to provide the researcher’s interpretation of the results, provide areas 




 This thesis began with the purpose of determining the effect of Army 
Transformation on supply effectiveness for BCT level units and attempting to identify the 
effects of the supply effectiveness on customer ordering behavior in terms of the overuse 
of high priority designators and average order quantities with the intent of providing an 
in-process review of the current status of logistics transformation.  Answering this 
problem involved analyzing three separate subproblems.  The results in some areas were 
expected and in others there were surprises. 
Subproblem 1 
 
 Subproblem 1 looked at the effect of Army transformation on the supply 
effectiveness characteristics of CWT and requisition backorders.  The test results showed 
clearly that CWT is lower and has lower variance in the transformed BCT.  This was 
expected due to the removal of management layers at the Division level which allows a 
BCT warehouse to order directly through the higher supply echelons.  The test results 
also showed that the number of requisition backorders was significantly higher in a 
transformed BCT.  These seemingly opposite results were reconciled with the fact that 
the backorder quantities were not driving higher order quantities or assignment of more 
high priority designators to requisitions.   
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 It is important to note that the backorder quantities are not always a bad result.  
Modular BCTs are designed for more agility which requires a lighter load carried with in 
the organization.  This reduction in load includes reducing what is stocked in that BCT’s 
warehouse.  Obviously with a reduced stockage list, the number of backorders will 
increase.  Customers can plan for the potential lead times for requisitions, provided that 
CWT variance is steady.  An additional mitigating factor is the overall reduction in CWT 
achieved in the transformed BCT. 
 Based on this, it is apparent that overall supply effectiveness is improving with 
the transformed BCT.  This shows that some of the steps taken so far in logistics 
transformation are working well. 
Subproblem 2 
 
 The second subproblem attempted to establish the correlation of the supply 
effectiveness indicators of requisition backorders and CWT to the ordering characteristics 
of average order quantity and requisition priority designators.  The results for this 
subproblem were simple, there was no correlation based on the sample used for this 
study.  These characteristics do have relevance in the civilian world, but in the world of 
the U.S. Army there is not a correlation.  This result is not discouraging, in that it points 
out the fact that more research is needed into the topic in order to address the factors that 
cause over-ordering and misuse of priority designators. 
Subproblem 3 
 
 The third subproblem sought to account for other sources of variance in the 
results.  Part one of the subproblem analyzed the differences in the numbers of 
requisitions between garrison and Iraq.  The result was surprising in that the difference in 
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the quantities of requisitions is insignificant.  This shows that unexpected numbers of 
requisitions are not causing a strain on the logistics framework. 
 The second part of the subproblem served to analyze whether or not the 
percentages of requisitions for each of the three priority designators remained the same 
based on the number of requisitions.  This was found to hold true.  Another surprising 
result was that the percentage of high priority requisitions increased by 19 percentage 
points for Class II and 21 percentage points for Class IX when the comparison was made 
between garrison and Iraq requisitions.  A follow-on t-test revealed that the average CWT 
was not significantly different between Iraq and garrison. 
Thoughts on High Priority 
 
 This begs the question of why the large increase in high priority requisitions; the 
short answer is because they can order high priority.  A longer, more involved answer 
requires an understanding of the sense of urgency involved in the Iraq Theater of 
Operations.  This researcher believes that the same urge that causes people to rush out 
before a hurricane or severe weather and buy everything they see in the store, also effects 
troops in Iraq.  There is a great worry that they will not have something they need.  From 
personal experience as a commander in Iraq, this problem is understandable.  This 
researcher frequently sought to order an item as many ways as possible just in case the 
unit needed it. 
 This researcher’s first exposure to this phenomenon was as a Second Lieutenant.  
Serving as the logistics officer operating a base camp for units training for Bosnia, one of 
the many illustrious duties was to ensure there was enough toilet paper.  The Non-
Commissioned Officer working for me would dutifully check the latrines and replace 
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missing rolls.  He would constantly fret over the amounts being consumed.  After 
addressing this issue to the Major that I worked for, he told me to fill the bathroom 
windows with rolls of toilet paper.  In response to my look of confusion, he explained 
that soldiers always worry that critical items will not be available when they really need 
them.  This is most obvious with toilet paper.  Due to fears of shortages, the average 
soldier’s first task is to take a roll of toilet paper from the latrine.  The next soldier sees a 
roll missing and thinks there is a shortage, so he takes one too.  This cycle continues until 
everyone has their own roll and they begin to consume what is actually in the latrine.  By 
filling the windows with rolls, the perception of a shortage is alleviated and less toilet 
paper is required overall. 
 This analogy applies to every item of supply in the inventory.  Despite the fact 
that CWT is lower and less variant and the overall supply system is more responsive, 
soldiers do not trust what they do not see or understand.  Understanding the drivers of 
high priority requisitions and addressing potential overuse requires education of 
logisticians and maneuver commanders.  High priority requisitions are a drain on the 
resources of the supply chain and with over 50% being high PD02, these requisitions 
become average priority by default.  This results in odd circumstances where lower 
priority requisitions arrive faster on a ship, than a high priority requisition coming by air.   
 
Areas for Further Research 
 
 This research shows the need for several avenues for additional research.  The 
first suggestion is a similar analysis broken down by actual stock numbers.  This would 
allow for identification of the actual items that are causing any discrepancies, as well as 
validate the aggregate results presented here.  A second area for research is a behavioral 
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type study on the factors that cause customers to order the way they do.  This has been 
accomplished in the civilian sector, but the military is unique in that there is no profit 
incentive.  The third recommendation for research is a multiple regression analysis to 
control for other variables and autocorrelation of the data, as well as attempt to infer 
causality.  A final area for research is to extend the study back in time and look at the 
characteristics over a longer period to identify any long-term trends that might serve to 
add to the research. 
 
Why These Studies are Important 
 
 Understanding the results of the changes and being able to quantify improvements 
is critical in educating customers on the supply system.  Quantification of ideas also helps 
erase the old “common-sense” type beliefs and fill them with grounded reality.  If one 
can not quantify a problem and present quantifiable results, the problem can not be 
solved without the intervention of extreme luck and a great deal of hope.  It is known 
throughout the Army that “hope is not a method,” therefore it should not serve as a 
method for addressing logistical shortfalls and problems. 
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Appendix A. Data Tables 
 
 
 This appendix provides a listing of the periods used for calculations and a sample 
of the data table. 
Table 7. Periods for Analysis 
Unit 1 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 2
Garrison Iraq Garrison Iraq
1 6/12/2005 6/5/2006 6/12/2005 5/8/2006
2 7/11/2005 6/12/2006 7/11/2005 5/15/2006
3 7/17/2005 6/19/2006 7/17/2005 5/22/2006
4 7/24/2005 6/26/2006 7/24/2005 5/31/2006
5 7/31/2005 7/3/2006 7/31/2005 6/5/2006
6 8/7/2005 7/10/2006 8/7/2005 6/12/2006
7 8/14/2005 7/17/2006 8/14/2005 6/19/2006
8 8/21/2005 7/24/2006 8/21/2005 6/26/2006
9 8/28/2005 7/31/2006 8/28/2005 7/3/2006
10 9/4/2005 8/7/2006 9/4/2005 7/10/2006
11 9/11/2005 8/13/2006 9/11/2005 7/17/2006
12 9/18/2005 8/22/2006 9/18/2005 7/24/2006
13 9/25/2005 8/27/2006 9/25/2005 7/31/2006
14 10/2/2005 9/3/2006 10/2/2005 8/7/2006
15 10/10/2005 9/10/2006 10/10/2005 8/13/2006
16 10/16/2005 9/17/2006 10/16/2005 8/22/2006
17 10/23/2005 9/24/2006 10/23/2005 8/27/2006
18 10/30/2005 10/1/2006 10/30/2005 9/3/2006
19 11/6/2005 10/8/2006 9/10/2006
20 11/13/2005 10/15/2006 9/17/2006
21 11/21/2005 10/22/2006 9/24/2006




26 11/26/2006 10/29/2006  
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Table 8. Sample Data Table 
Unit 1 Garrison
Period AVE CWT CWT VAR
Backorder 
>30 days AVE AGE 2 5 12 TOT
AVE 
ORDER VAR
6/12/2005 49.79 6165.41 189 34.30 151 1398 368 1917 6.24 421.45
7/11/2005 33.71 1796.45 244 36.32 7 516 465 988 4.91 268.60
7/17/2005 27.43 1206.02 258 43.02 3 24 330 357 12.54 2175.87
7/24/2005 21.98 839.18 240 34.23 1 114 93 208 12.97 310.68
7/31/2005 24.19 880.98 302 41.03 0 0 1 1 1.00 0.00
8/7/2005 40.03 827.57 231 36.42 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00
8/14/2005 43.86 1601.68 207 39.68 88 9 267 364 3.51 123.61
8/21/2005 51.72 2089.78 267 35.66 0 9 58 67 18.55 581.28
8/28/2005 45.81 1242.74 225 38.61 18 148 77 243 12.12 1362.98
9/4/2005 63.67 3911.26 256 43.69 4 39 111 154 5.19 220.64
9/11/2005 70.27 6324.31 244 48.99 72 41 75 188 12.15 177.56
9/18/2005 35.78 1865.06 233 57.69 59 72 67 198 13.28 645.18
9/25/2005 39.51 6120.13 293 58.22 175 60 75 310 15.84 1029.43
10/2/2005 31.38 2524.24 228 56.40 8 4 55 67 8.39 49.15
10/10/2005 35.67 1954.16 218 58.07 27 70 0 97 10.89 281.93
10/16/2005 45.56 3912.88 220 64.77 194 62 91 347 11.63 306.90
10/23/2005 24.04 928.39 214 69.37 284 125 485 894 9.43 445.17
10/30/2005 12.42 942.70 243 58.51 33 15 1 49 12.55 240.71
11/6/2005 20.47 1184.31 227 58.57 13 0 0 13 9.23 22.03
11/13/2005 20.63 813.38 214 68.58 8 107 34 149 10.62 245.10
11/21/2005 43.94 1414.89 247 79.88 4 15 0 19 51.47 17229.71
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